IS year 1 · The Hague (WH)
The complete summary of World History (WH) in IS at The Hague, in the order of the lectures: per week the core, the concepts and the connections you need for the exam. Week 1 is free to read in the reader with an account.
Literature: Duyvesteyn & Van der Wal (eds.), World History for International Studies (Leiden University Press, 2022, open access). Based on the prescribed reading only: lecture slides and recordings are the university's copyrighted material and are not covered.
12 chapters across 12 weeks · 240 flashcards · 120 practice questions · 60 open questions with a model answer
Complete bundle World History: €34,00 one off (separately €42,00, you save €8,00). Pay with iDEAL, instant access, no subscription.
The rest of World History in one go: pay once with iDEAL, instant access, no subscription.
See prices · Practise with World History · Common mistakes in World History
You have spotted a real tension, and the chapter half admits it. Meta-history is defined as the interpretation of history according to an overarching meaning or internal logic leading towards an ultimate end point, and teleology is named as its risk: once you think you know the end point, all evidence gets read as working towards it. World History does carry an overarching logic. Migration, trade and travelling ideas along networks, producing tighter and tighter connection, is a claim about the whole of the human past, and the field adds a normative ideal on top of it in global citizenship.
The defence runs in two steps. First, the field refuses the end point. The chapter says plainly that none of this is linear, that globalization retreated in the interbellum and arguably does so again, so connection is a pattern you have to demonstrate for each case rather than a destination the past is heading for. Fukuyama has liberty and democracy waiting at the finish, and Marx has revolution; connection is not that kind of claim, because nothing in it says what the world is supposed to end up as. Second, the field polices itself with the other two tools. Historicism forces every case back to its own time and place and to primary sources, and comparative research design makes you hold cases against each other instead of arranging them in a queue. Spengler and Toynbee are in the chapter as the warning: both were criticized for lacking academic standards, and both had the shape of the argument decided before the evidence came in.
What stays uncomfortable is the ideal of global citizenship, because a normative ambition is exactly where an end point hides. The useful answer at exam level is not that World History escapes meta-history, but that it is a meta-history which has made its own narrative visible and keeps the end point out.
Start with what historicism actually asks of you. Ranke's invitation was to show how it really was: weigh context, place and culture, interpret carefully, and spell out your own biases. That last part matters, because it is an instruction to be honest about your position, not to pretend you have none. A historicist refuses universalist claims and present-day moral yardsticks, which is a rule about explanation, not a vow of silence.
Then look at what the chapter does with the Great Dying. It reports that germs carried across the Atlantic killed over fifty million indigenous Americans, almost 90 percent of that population, and that subsistence farming ended so forests came back. Every word of that is description, and yet nobody reads it as neutral. The job advertisement from 1955 works the same way: read historicist, it tells you what an office was assumed to be, and it still tells you something you would not want back.
So the line you are looking for sits somewhere between explaining a period in its own terms and refusing to say anything about it, and the chapter walks it without drawing it. Where do you think it runs, and does the field's own ideal of global citizenship mean the authors ever intended to stay on the descriptive side of it?
No, because her complaint is about the criterion and not about the word. The definition the handbook works with, from chapter 1, is a complex society bound together by common rule, sharing a common territory, identity, means of communication and religion. Read that fourth item closely: means of communication, not script. A Griot satisfies it, and so does a marked stone from Blombos Cave, because meaningful communication is defined as the deliberate transfer of information through a verbal medium or a non-verbal one such as drawing, movement or objects. Nothing in that sentence requires a scribe.
The damage came from textbook definitions that named written language specifically, and from the static binaries that travel with them: civilized against uncivilized, urban against rural, sedentary against nomadic. Once writing is the test, the consequences follow fast. With the Rankean school the discipline narrowed to the written past, everything reconstructed from non-written evidence became prehistoric, societies that kept their past orally counted as people without history, and Hegel could write that Africa is no historical part of the World. The fix is to remove the literacy clause, not to abandon the term, which is exactly what the handbook did.
What you should still be uneasy about is the word itself. Even without the clause, civilization sorts societies into complex and not complex, and the chapter does not solve that. If you want to make this point in an exam, make it as the second half of your answer rather than the first: name the criterion that was removed, then say that the ranking survives the removal.
The principle is not in doubt. Ibn Khaldun applied source critique to oral and written accounts alike and accepted oral accounts as primary sources, centuries before Ranke, and the trap the chapter names is reading oral as a synonym for unreliable. Reliability depends on the critique, not on whether something was spoken or written down.
But a source also has a purpose, and the two here are not the same. The Sundiata says its own purpose out loud: it is the griot who rescues the memories of kings from oblivion, as men have short memories, and the epic's value sits as much in moral lessons and dialogue with the audience as in factual accuracy. That is not a defect, it is a different kind of evidence, and it tells you what a society wanted its own founding to mean. Then turn the same suspicion on the other side. Hieroglyphs grew out of tax administration and cuneiform out of accounting, so the first scripts existed to record ownership and value, and mortuary texts were set down as an aide-memoire and became the authority scribes relied on. A ledger is not a neutral witness either, it is the record of whoever was counting.
So the real question is not which medium you trust. It is which question each source can answer. Work out what you can learn from the Sundiata that no tax list could give you, and then answer the one that decides it: which of the two is the more biased source about who actually held power in Mali?
Write it in three steps: what the label says, what it distorts, and what it still does. Ferdinand von Richthofen coined Silk Roads in the nineteenth century for the overland routes between China and Europe that emerged in the first century CE and lasted, on and off, for 1,500 years. Three things in that sentence do not survive the evidence. Silk was one commodity among many and often money rather than merchandise, since bolts paid troops and bought horses at 38 to 40 bolts each, and silk cloth is absent as a commodity in the Turfan paper shoes while appearing as payment and collateral. Goods moved and traders did not, because cargo was sold on at every market with the price rising through taxes and scarcity, so Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta are exceptions rather than examples. And the network predates both ends of it: Ur traded with the Indus valley some 4,500 years ago, and Chinese silk sat in the hair of a mummy at Deir el Medina around 1000 BCE, long before Han China and Rome joined.
The fourth correction is the chapter's own and the largest: the sea carried more than the land. Half of a camel train of 200 to 300 animals carried trade goods at roughly 150 kilos each, so 15 to 22.5 tons, while one dhow held 300 tons, the equivalent of twenty camel trains. The Intan wreck and the Cirebon dhow, with 200 tons of Chinese earthenware and 40 tons of metal ingots, are what that looks like on the sea floor.
Keeping the name is a compromise, and the handbook says so by redefining it: the trade routes connecting Asia, Europe and Africa, by land and by sea. Add the political half if you want the marks. The label is not innocent, because tying the network to Rome made a Eurasian story European, and Xi Jinping revived it for the Belt and Road precisely because it still carries that romance, even though rail moves under five percent of Asia to Europe trade against 24.7 million sea containers in 2019.
They are answering different questions, which is the first thing to notice. Wallerstein sorts the world into core, periphery and semi-periphery by role in production, so his question is where wealth concentrates and why; he gave the old Silk Roads a part only by having them collapse and clear the way for European capitalism, while Frank and Gill answered that such a system had run for at least 5,000 years with China at the core. Turchin asks where mega-empires come from and answers with a feedback loop: nomads raid stored harvests, farmers fortify and organize, nomads improve in turn, on three conditions of environmental gradient, nomadic military superiority and a deep hinterland. One is about economic roles, the other about a military cycle, and in principle a cycle like that could run inside a system like that.
Two things should slow you down before you stack them. The chapter's own warning about labels applies to theories too: pastoral to agricultural to urban, feudalism through capitalism to communism, autocracy to democracy, with Europeans at the top of every scale. And there is a third explanation in the chapter that needs neither, since Niel Petersen ties the Mongols to climate, with wetter conditions growing the grasslands and the horses and drought preceding the decline.
So test them the way you would test any framework here. Decide what evidence would have to turn up for one of the three to lose ground, and then answer the question that follows from it: what do the paper shoes of Turfan and the mixed cargo of the Intan wreck actually count as evidence for, a world system, imperiogenesis, climate, or none of the three?